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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-EFFECT OF FILING COUNTERCLAIM AFTER
DENIAL OF OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION-Plaintiff brought suit in the Municipal Court of Cleveland based on an automobile collision which occurred in
the city. Defendant was served by mail at his residence outside the city
and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Appearing specially,
defendant moved to quash service of summons; the trial court overruled
the motion and gave him leave to plead. Defendant then filed a counterclaim based on the same collision, alleging the negligence of the plaintiff
and requesting damages. On appeal of the decision overruling his motion
to quash service, held, defendant had not waived his objection to jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in his answer. Bennett v. Radlick, (Ohio
App. 1957) 145 N.E. (2d) 334.
The Ohio courts have frequently held that a defendant does not waive
jurisdictional defects by defending on the merits after an objection to
jurisdiction over the person, made in a special appearance,1 has been
overruled.2 To hold otherwise would impose upon the defendant the unfair choice of either defending on the merits and thereby waiving the
"valuable right" 3 to contest jurisdiction, or relying on his exception to
jurisdiction at the risk of losing his defense on the merits.4 Generally, the
rule is limited to defenses and is not extended to the case where the defendant requests affirmative relief.5 The principal case extends the rule where the

1 The timing of defensive pleadings or motions in connection with special appearances
is crucial. Any motions or pleadings other than those relating to objections to jurisdiction
over the person made before the court passes upon the jurisdictional objection are generally held to effect a general appearance. See 111 A.L.R. 925 (1937).
2 Ohio Electric Ry. Co. v. United States Express Co., 105 Ohio St. 331, 137 N.E. 1
(1922); Glass v. McCullough Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 115 N.E. (2d) 78 (1953). There
is a conflict in the decisions in other states on this question. See 93 A.L.R. 1302 (1934),
107 A.L.R. 1102 (1937). 34 CoRN. L. Q. 230 (1948) suggests that the majority and more
modern view is that the defendant may defend on the merits without waiving his jurisdictional objections.
3 Principal case at 339. Not all courts agree that a "valuable right" is involved, some
treating objections to jurisdiction over the person as merely dilatory where the defendant
is before the court on special appearance. Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82, 103 P.
317 (1909). Cf. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
4 Ohio Electric Ry. Co. v. United States Express Co., note 2 supra. For discussions
of the arguments on both sides of this question, see 9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 396 (1911), 34 CORN.
L. Q. 230 (1948). The reason why the defendant is put to this unfair choice is that a
denial of a motion to quash service of summons, or similar motion, is generally held not
to be an appealable order. Thus the defendant would have to allow a default judgment
to be entered against him before he could get an appellate ruling on the jurisdiction
question. Burns v. Northwestern National Bank, 65 N.D. 473, 260 N.W. 253 (1935). In
some jurisdictions, however, prohibition may be used •to test the defendant's exception
[Oak Park Country Club v. Goodland, 242 Wis. 320, 7 N.W. (2d) 828 (1943)], while in
others this has been specifically denied [State ex rel. Rhodes v. Solether, 162 Ohio St.
559, 124 N.E. (2d) 411 (1955)].
5 Morehart v. Furley, 149 Minn. 56, 182 N.W. 723 (1921); Chandler v. Citizens'
National Bank, 149 Ind. 601, 49 N.E. 579 (1898).
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defendant's counterclaim is based on the same facts as the complaint. Since
the controversy over the facts in the plaintiff's complaint is already before
the court, it is reasoned that the defendant does not "invoke the jurisdiction of the court anew" 6 by asserting a counterclaim based on the same
facts. 7 In addition, the court asserts that the reasons for allowing a defense
on the merits apply equally to the counterclaim, because a judgment for
plaintiff would bar any subsequent claim by the defendant. 8 The court
cites no authority for its holding, and there appear to be few if any cases
that have gone this far. 9 The soundness of the court's reasoning would
seem to tum upon a question not discussed in the opinion, whether a
defendant may interpose as a defense facts which would justify a counterclaim and, if judgment is rendered in his favor, bring a subsequent suit
for affirmative relief on these same facts. In general the courts distinguish
between use of the defensive matter merely as facts inconsistent with plaintiff's cause of action10 and the assertion of a claim by way of recoupment or
set-off. In the latter case, subsequent use of the same facts to sue for the
balance of the claim constitutes splitting of a cause of action and is denied.11
Moreover, in states having compulsory counterclaim statutes, 12 the subsequent claim may be barred if it arose out of the same transaction as the
complaint in the original suit. Where the defendant would not be barred
in the subsequent suit he stands in no danger of losing his counterclaim
by not requesting affirmative relief in the first suit, and the argument of the
court in the principal case that the defendant would be prejudiced by not
allowing the counterclaim fails.13 Where the counterclaim is barred or is
made compulsory by statute, however, the principal case in conforming
with the policy against forcing defendant to an election of defenses is

6 Principal case at
7 The general view

339.
where the same facts are presented is, however, to the contrary.
See, e.g., Merchants Heat and Light Co. v. Clow and Sons, 204 U.S. 286 (1907).
8 This conclusion is based on the fact that a judgment for plaintiff, as in the negligence action here, would operate as res judicata as to any subsequent claim by defendant,
such a judgment being a determination that defendant was negligent and plaintiff was not.
See 8 A.L.R. 727 (1920) for a discussion of this point.
9 There is dictum in Buckley v. John, 314 Mass. 719 at 721, 51 N.E. (2d) 317 (1943),
to the effect that, "we are not inclined to regard the counterclaim as a general submission
to the jurisdiction for the reason that he was probably required to file it by Rule 32 of
Superior Court . . . or run the risk of losing rights."
10 Benedict v. Nielsen, 204 Iowa 1373, 215 N.W. 658 (1927); Ott v. DuPlan Silk Corp.,
271 Pa. 322, 114 A. 630 (1921). See also cases collected at 83 A.L.R. 654 (1933).
11 Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 165 S.C. 457, 164 S.E. 136 (1932).
12 For a list of these jurisdictions, in addition to the federal system, see 8 A.L.R.
727 (1920).
13 The principal case does make one further argument in support of its ruling.
Although there is no compulsory counterclaim in Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin,
1953) §2323.40, provides that if a defendant omits to set up a counterclaim he cannot
recover costs against the plaintiff in any subsequent action thereon. The court argues,
at page 339, that a defendant would therefore be "penalized" by not filing his counterclaim.
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sound.14 In such situations there would seem to be no reason for distinguishing between defenses on the merits and counterclaims arising out
of the facts involved in the complaint.
David Shute, S.Ed.

14 Obviously, in those jurisdictions that hold a defense on the merits to constitute
a waiver of jurisdictional defects, it would follow, a fortiori, that filing a counterclaim
would also have that effect.

